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Statutory Construction And The 
Right To Vote 
In State v. Broadwater, 1 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland unanimously af-
firmed the Circuit Court for Prince 
George's County, reinstating the right to 
vote of a former Maryland state senator 
who had been convicted of infamous 
crimes. This was a case of first impres-
sion, interpreting the 1974 exception to 
the rule oflifetime disenfranchisement. 
Background 
Tommie Broadwater, Jr., while a Mary-
land state senator from Prince George's 
County, was convicted in 1983, in the 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland, of four counts of food 
stamp fraud2 and one count of conspir-
acy to commit food stamp fraud.3 He was 
sentenced to three years, concurrent on 
each count, with all but six months sus-
pended, followed by four years proba-
tion and 1,000 hours of community seLV-
ice.4 Additionally, he was fined 520,000.00 
and ordered to pay S 18,420.00 in restitu-
tion.' As a result of his conviction, Broad-
water's name was stricken from the reg-
istry of qualified voters in Prince George's 
County. 
While Broadwater was incarcerated, 
the Maryland General Assembly and the 
voters modified the Maryland 
Constitution, requiring voter registration 
as a condition of eligibility for seeking or 
holding elective office.6 After Broadwater 
seLVed his prison term and while he was 
on probation, he unsuccessfully chal-
lenged this constitutional amendment as 
a violation of the equal protection clause 
of the United States Constitution.' 
Upon completion of his probationary 
period, he attempted to register again as 
a voter but was denied because of his 
"conviction of disqualifying crimes." 
Broadwater filed suit in the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County against the 
Prince George's County Board of Super-
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visors of Elections for denying him the 
right to vote. The State of Maryland, 
through the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, inteLVened on behalf of the Board.8 
At both the trial level and the appellate 
level, Broadwater'S attack was based on 
principles of statutory construction and 
constitutional equal protection analysis. 
The statutory construction argument was 
whether one criminal proceeding in 
which there is an adjudication of guilt 
and sentencing thereon is only one "con-
viction" within the meaning of the elec-
tion laws and thus Broadwater is eligible 
to vote. The constitutional argument was 
whether, assuming the statute were in-
terpreted to deny Broadwater the right to 
vote, the statute would violate equal 
protection by restoring the right to vote 
to rehabilitated first-timers who were con-
victed of one count in one trial, while im-
posing lifetime disenfranchisement on 
rehabilitated first-timers who were con-
victed of multiple counts in one trial. 
Circuit Court Judge Robert J. Woods 
ruled that the statute is constitutional 
and that Broadwater's interpretation ofit 
is correct. The State and the Board ap-
pealed on the statutory construction is-
sue; Broadwater cross-appealed on the 
equal protection issue. The State filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, asking the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland to take the 
case prior to consideration by the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland. The court 
of appeals granted the State's petition 
and sua sponte granted a cross-petition 
for the equal protection issue on which 
Broadwater had cross-appealed.' In its 
affirmance of the circuit court, the court 
of appeals adopted most, but not all, of 
Br<;>adwater's seven statutory construc-
tion arguments. However, the court de-
clined to address the equal protection 
argument. Judge Rodowsky stated: 
At issue here is how § 3-4(c) applies 
where there were guilty verdicts and 
sentences on multiple counts charg-
ing infamous crimes in a single in-
dictment against a person never pre-
viously convicted of an infamous 
crime. . .. Based primarily on the 
legislative history of the section and 
on the social history immediately 
surrounding its enactment, we hold 
that Broadwater'S construction is 
correct. 10 
Statutory Construction 
Broadwater's various statutory con-
struction arguments all support the posi-
tion that the legislature did not intend 
the disparate result of reinfranchising re-
habilitated first-timers convicted of one 
count in one trial, while disenfranchising 
for life rehabilitated first-timers convicted 
of multiple counts in one trial. Argued af-
firmatively, the Maryland General Assem-
bly, under the theory of rehabilitation of 
ex-offenders, enacted article 33, section 
3-4 ( c), ending Maryland's rule oflifetime 
disenfranchisement of convicted felons, 
with the intent that first-timers, such as 
Broadwater, are entitled to vote after 
completing their period of incarceration 
and parole. 
From 1851 to 1972, under both the 
Maryland Constitution and the Maryland 
Annotated Code, persons convicted of 
infamous crimes were disenfranchised 
for life, unless pardoned by the Gover-
norY In 1972, the legislature enacted a 
law, subject to voter approval, "provid-
ing for the repeal of the constitutional 
prohibition of the right to vote for these 
persons. "12 The statute proposed that the 
voters delegate to the legislature the 
decision "to regulate or prohibit the right 
to vote of a person convicted of infamous 
or other serious crimes .... "13 In 1974, 
the General Assembly ameliorated the 
lifetime disenfranchisement by restoring 
the right to vote to any person if, "in con-
nection with his first such conviction 
only, he has completed any sentence im-
posed pursuantto that conviction .... "I~ 
The dispute in this case was simple. 
The State asserted that each count or unit 
of prosecution constitutes a "conviction" 
within the meaning of section 3-4(c). 
Accordingly, because Broadwater was 
convicted of multiple counts in one trial, 
he is beyond his "first such conviction" 
and therefore ineligible to vote. Broad-
water asserted that "conviction", under 
section 3-4( c), means a criminal proceed-
ing in which there is adjudication of guilt 
and sentencing. Accordingly, because 
there was only one criminal prosecution, 
Le., he was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced only once, such adjudication was 
his "first such conviction" and he is there-
fore eligible to vote. 
The 1974 amendment changed the law 
from one of total disenfranchisement to 
one ofless-than-total disenfranchisement. 
It provided some amelioration of the civil 
disability of lifetime disenfranchisement 
previously imposed upon the right to 
vote. However, the legislature did not 
totally eliminate the disability. 
"[T]he search for legislative intent [is] 
an effort to' ... discern some general pur-
pose, aim, or policy reflected in the stat-
ute ... ,'''u Here, the legislative intent can 
be gleaned from synthesizing the an-
swers to two questions: (1) why did the 
legislature ameliorate the harshness at 
all, and (2) why didn't it completely ame-
liorate the disenfranchisement? The only 
theory that explains some, yet not total, 
restoration of the right to vote is rehabili-
tation. This is the only rational explana-
tion for restoring the right to vote to 
some persons while continuing to deny 
forever the right to vote to others. Per-
sons convicted of infamous crimes and 
rehabilitated may vote; persons convicted 
ofinfamous crimes and not rehabilitated 
may not vote. The rehabilitation line is 
drawn "in connection with his first such 
conviction only. "16 
Broadwater argued that the legislative 
goal of rehabilitation can be discerned 
from the national trend concerning the 
restoration of voting rights at the time of 
the 1974 amendment, from general prin-
ciples of statutory construction, and by 
analogy to the judicial interpretation of 
similar statutory language. 
The National Trend Toward Voting 
Rights Restoration 
When interpreting statutes, courts con-
sider "the circumstances existing and 
events occurring"17 when they were en-
acted, including the "cause or necessity 
of making the Act .... "18 The statutory 
1974 amelioration of the long-standing 
rule of lifetime disenfranchisement was 
no accident. It reflected the legislature's 
understanding of, and agreement with, 
the extensive trend at the beginning of 
the 1970's to ameliorate the historical 
harshness of disenfranchisement through 
the enactment of laws restoring the right 
to vote to rehabilitated ex-offenders who 
had completed the sanctions resulting 
from their convictions. 
"The 1974 
Amendment 
changed the law 
from one of total 
disenfranchisement 
to one of less-than 
total 
disenfranchisement. " 
Disenfranchisement of certain ex-of-
fenders, on theories such as punishment 
and the purity of the ballot, has existed 
for centuries.19 Lifetime disenfranchise-
ment demonstrates a rejection of, or at 
least a failure to consider, rehabilitation. 
The dilemma posed by these con-
flicting goals [of protection of soci-
ety and rehabilitation of ex-offend-
ers] is clearly reflected in existing 
civil disability laws. In the apparent 
interest of societal protection, legis-
latures have seen fit to place numer-
ous restrictions on activities of con-
victed criminals . . . after release 
from prison. Although these laws 
were enacted in piecemeal fashion 
over a period spanning two centu-
ries and in many instances were 
founded upon penal concepts that 
have long since been discredited, 
they continue to deprive former 
convicts of many rights and privi-
leges exercised by normal citizens. zo 
Under the policy of disenfranchise-
ment, "the protection of the public is 
only tenuous. . . while the loss to the 
offender is the opportunity to share in 
government. [D]isenfranchisement can 
find its analogue in ancient physical os-
tracism: instead of physically expelling 
the individual, he is expelled from the 
body politic."ZI 
During the past twenty-five years, a 
rapidly emerging theory of rehabilitation 
has favored restoration of the right to 
vote for ex-offenders. "If the criminal 
justice system is intended to rehabilitate 
criminals, it must treat them as full·fledged 
citizens."22 Part of the impetus for this 
trend came from four model acts espous-
ing a rehabilitation approach to the dis-
enfranchisement/restoration issue. 
The model act of the National Proba-
tion and Parole Association provides for 
restoration of the right to vote upon re-
lease from incarceration.Z3 The Model 
Penal Code includes restoration of the 
right to vote upon two years of nonrecid-
ivism for persons who had been incarcer-
ated and upon fulfillment of probation 
and/or parole conditions. H Both the 
model act of the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency25 and the Uni-
form Act on Status of Convicted Persons26 
provide for restoration of the right to 
vote upon completion of probation, in-
carceration, and/or parole. Legal com-
mentators also insisted upon reform: 
[M]ethods for timely restoration of 
all deprived rights and privileges to 
reformed offenders are essential if 
ex-convicts are to make satisfactory 
readjustment in the community. 
[T]he entire scheme of civil dis-
abilities must be re-examined and 
restrictions that are not necessary to 
protect the public must be elimi-
nated .... 
[I]maginative measures are needed 
to ensure that the disabilities im-
posed are removed as soon as the 
convict's rehabilitative progress 
indicates this action is warranted. 27 
Another commentary included: 
[D]isenfranchisement as a conse-
quence of criminal conviction should 
be abandoned in a society commit-
ted to individual rights and a just re-
habilitative penal system. 
Time and attitudes change. Crimi-
nal disenfranchisement may derive 
from ancient and once venerated 
doctrines, but its use today is an 
anachronism .... 
.... The recent trend away from this 
practice [ofdisenJranchisement] re-
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fleets an appreciation ofits deficien-
cies. Sociologically, it r:uns counter 
to the rehabilitative goal of mod-
ern criminal justice. 28 
By 1970, thirteen states had adopted 
automatic restoration.29By 1973, twenty-
five states had automatic restoration.30 
The extent and pace of this national trend 
in the early 1970's is significant in light of 
the pace inherent in the deliberative proc-
ess oflegislative bodies. The speed of the 
national shift is even more amazing be-
cause disenfranchisement is usually con-
tained in the state constitution and not 
merely in the code.31 
In 1972, the American Criminal law 
Review conducted a survey on restora-
tion of the right to vote, which was sent to 
members of the Maryland legislature.32 
The results indicated community-based 
support in Maryland for liberalization of 
the disenfranchisement law.33 The Mary-
land General Assembly then proposed, 
subject to voter approval, deletion of the 
lifetime diserifranchisement provision 
from the Constitution, with delegation of 
the issue to the legislature.34 In Novem-
ber 1972, 59.3% of the voters ratified the 
constitutional amendment. 3' 
Thus, in 1974, the legislature ended 
Maryland's era oflifetime disenfranchise-
ment. Adhering to the theory of rehabili-
tation, the legislature provided "one bite 
of the apple" to persons convicted of 
infamous crimes. Taking a position be-
tween the extremes oflifetime disenfran-
chisement and complete reenfranchise-
ment, the legislature provided for resto-
ration of the right to vote only for reha-
bilitated first-timers, based on comple-
tion of all sanctions imposed. 
Even Richardson v. Ramlrez,36 the case 
in which the Supreme Court upheld, 
against an equal protection challenge, a 
state's decision to disenfranchise all con-· 
victed felons, recognized that the trend 
was to disfavor such legislation. Chief 
Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist stated: 
"[T]he more modem view is that it is 
essential to the process of rehabilitating 
the ex-felon that he be returned to his 
role in society as a fully participating 
citizen when he has completed the serv-
ice of his term ... [This view] is indeed the 
more enlightened and sensible one .... "37 
Conviction Means Criminal 
Proceeding and Not Unit of Offense 
In 1972, the Maryland General Assem-
bly amended, with voter approval, the 
Maryland Constitution, delegating to it-
self the decision to regulate or prohibit 
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the right to vote.38 That legislation also 
amended article 33, section 3-4, by add-
ing a new subsection (c). Although sub-
section (c), as enacted, merely maintained 
the status quo of disenfranchisement, 
the provision, as originally introduced, 
would have disenfranchised only per-
sons "twice convicted."39 Even though 
the word "twice" was deleted prior to 
passage, the use of the term "twice con-
victed" is evidence that the legislature's 
frame of reference was the number of 
separate times convicted and not the 
number of counts for which convicted. 
In 1974, the legislature exercised the 
power delegated to it and amended ar-
ticle 33, section 3-4(c).40 When intro-
duced as Senate Bill 57, this legislation 
would have taken Maryland from a posi-
tion of no restoration of voting rights to 
one of total restoration every time an 
imposed sanction was completed. The 
bill provided: "No person shall be regis-
tered as a qualified voter if he has been 
convicted once of larceny or other infa-
mous crime, unless he has been par-
doned, or unless he has completed any 
sentence imposed .... "41 Although the 
bill was amended in committee, as with 
the 1972 legislation, the number of times 
convicted was the frame of reference. 
Senate Bill 57 was enacted as follows: 
"l AJ 'conviction' is 
'that legal 
proceeding which 
ascertains the gUilt 
of the party . ... " 
(c) No person shall be registered as 
a qualified voter if he has been con-
victed of larceny or other infamous 
crime, unless he has been pardoned, 
or, In connection with hlsfirst such 
conviction only, he has completed 
any sentence imposed pursuant to 
that conviction, including any pe-
riod of probation imposed by virtue 
of parole or otherwise in lieu of a 
sentence or part of a sentence.42 
Similarly, the preamble, as amended, 
specified that the statute was "[fJor the 
purpose of providing that a person may 
be registered as a qualified voter ifhe had 
been convicted of larceny or other infa-
mous crime only once . ... "43 
The only reasonable interpretation of 
"in connection with his first such convic-
tion only" derives not from the number 
of counts charged, but from whether the 
defendant is involved in his first criminal 
proceeding resulting in adjudication of 
guilt and sentencing. Regardless of the 
number of counts, if it is the first time that 
the defendant has been tried, convicted, 
and sentenced, it is "in connection with 
his first such conviction." 
The Court of Appeals had previously 
construed the meaning of the terms 
"convicted" and "conviction" in the con-
text of a civil disability statute. InMyers v. 
State,44 the court addressed whether a 
person who was found guilty of perjury 
and given probation before judgment 
was "convicted" of perjury and thus in-
competent to testify.4' Without a statu-
tory definition, the court stated that "the 
meaning of 'convicted' and 'conviction' 
turns upon the context and purpose with 
which those terms are used. "46 
"[A] 'conviction' is 'that legalproceed-
Ing which ascertains the guilt of the party 
... .'"47 "The meaning ofthe word 'con-
victed' ... involves all the necessary 
proceedings from the charge to the sen-
tence inclusive."48 "The word 'punished' 
... refers plainly to the penalty to be af-
fIxed to the crime, but the word 'con-
victed' is much broader in meaning .... 
[T]he word 'convicted' includes the ac-
cusation and the trial. "49 
Broadwater argued, and the court 
agreed, that the only relevant "context 
and purpose" of "conviction" is whatever 
the legislature intended when it specifIed 
that a person otherwise disqualified 
could, following completion of his sen-
tence, vote "in connection with his fIrst 
such conviction only." In using the statu-
torily undefIned word "conviction," the 
legislature meant "criminal proceeding." 
"Conviction" in article 33, section 3-4 (c) , 
refers to the process and not to the result. 
The word "conviction", used as a meas-
urement of the number of adjudicatory 
proceedings and not as a measurement 
ofthe number of counts, is better under-
stood in the context of "only, " the first of 
two qualifIers necessary for restoration 
of the right to vote. That right, having 
been lost as a result of conviction of 
infamous crimes, can be restored only in 
connection with the defendant's fIrst such 
conviction. "Only" means "a single ... in-
stance or occurrence .'0 "Only" means "at 
no other time . ..,1 
The legislature's message is clear. It 
would no longer bar from the voting 
booth forever those persons convicted of 
infamous crimes. However, it would 
provide only one chance for rehabilita-
tion and hence restoration of the right to 
vote. The legislature did not provide this 
opportunity only to those with "one 
count"; instead, it provided this opportu-
nity only one time-to "first-timers." 
The second qualifier for voting rights 
restoration is that the defendant must 
have "completed any sentence imposed 
pursuant to that conviction, including 
any period of probation imposed by vir-
tue of parole or otherwise in lieu of a 
sentence or part of a sentence."'2 This 
qualifier shows that restoration of the 
right to vote is predicated on rehabilita-
tion. Rehabilitation is predicated on 
completing the outstanding obligation 
to the State and is limited to "once." 
If article 33, section 3-4 (c) , were inter-
preted as the State urged, rehabilitated 
first-timers who were convicted of one 
count in one trial could vote. However, 
rehabilitated first-timers who were con-
victed of multiple counts in one trial 
could not vote because they would auto-
matically be beyond their "first such 
conviction only." It seems inconceivable 
that the legislature would enact a voting 
restoration act for rehabilitated ex-of-
fenders that automatically precludes from 
its coverage a substantial percentage, if 
not a majority, of those persons who oth-
elWise would come within its scope. 
"[W]hen a statute is plainly susceptible of 
more than one meaning and thus con-
tains an ambiguity the court may con-
sider the consequences resulting from 
one meaning rather than another and 
adopt that construction which avoids an 
illogical or unreasonable result, or one 
which is inconsistent with common 
sense."" 
Judge Rodowsky stated the poSition of 
the Court of Appeals as follows: 
Thus, the legislative purpose of the 
language relied upon by the State 
concerns the timing or sequence of 
convictions and not the interrela-
tionship of charges in a multiple 
count indictment. The "first such 
conviction" does not refer to the 
lowest numbered count charging 
an infamous crime on which there is 
a verdict or plea of guilty in an in-
dictment charging multiple infa-
mous crimes. "[F]irst such convic-
tion" is used in the broader, layper-
son's sense of the occasion of con-
viction of a person who is a first time 
offender, as opposed to a repeat of-
fender. If a person who has never 
previously been convicted of an imfa-
mous crime suffers a "first such con-
viction," the eligibility to re-register 
as a voter arises when the first time 
infamous crime offender has com-
pleted the entire sentence imposed 
on all proven counts for all crimes of 
all types on the occasion of that "first 
such conviction."" 
"Recidivist statutes 
are enacted in an 
effort to deter and 
punish incorrigible 
offenders . ... " 
"Conviction" Versus "Violation" 
In Montone v. State," the Court of 
Appeals, adopting the majority view, held 
that Maryland's habitual criminal statute 
requires sequential convictions, mean-
ing that the commission of one crime 
"must follow the offender's conviction 
for the preceding predicate crime. Under 
the theory of these cases, two convictions 
obtained on the same day may not each 
serve as a predicate conviction because 
the criminal has had no chance to re-
form between the first conviction and 
the commission of the offense upon which 
the second conviction is based.",6 
The court in Montone found persua-
sive several opinions from other states. 
"'Recidivist statutes are enacted in an ef-
fort to deter and punish incorrigible of-
fenders .... They are intended to apply to 
persistent violators who have not re-
sponded to the restraining influence of 
conviction and punishment. ",7 "'It is the 
commission of the second felony after 
conviction for the first ... that is deemed 
to make the defendant an incorrigible '".511 
"[WJhen an individual has been con-
victed two times before being exposed to 
the institutional rehabilitation efforts 
afforded by a term of imprisonment, the 
two convictions shall count only as 
one . ... "'9 
In State v. Johnson,6O not quoted in 
Montone, the court stated: 
[I]f one accepts the more modem 
view that our system of Criminal 
justice is aimed equally at rehabili-
tating offenders, then it would not 
be appropriate to sentence an ac-
cused as a second offender before 
he had had an opportunity to amend 
his ways after initial confrontation 
with the courts of law. 
[T]he great weight of authority in 
the United States appears to sup-
port the latter view .... 
[T] he social demand for increased 
penal sanctions would be directed 
primarily at the recidivist and not at 
an individual who had repeatedly 
committed offenses condemned by 
the statute but who had never been 
brought to the bar of justice.61 
Comparing statutes that require se-
quencing of convictions with those that 
do not, the court of appeals recognized 
in Montone that statutes that do not re-
quire sequencing are intended solely for 
punishment, and statutes that require se-
quencing are intended, at least in part, 
for rehabilitation. The court held that 
Maryland's habitual criminal statute62 is 
designed to identify persons incapable of 
rehabilitation. The court stated that only 
when the second conviction follows "an 
intervening exposure to the correctional 
system [can there be a determination of] 
that individual's capacity for rehabilita-
tion."63 
In Garrett v. State,64 the court also 
interpreted Maryland's habitual criminal 
statute. Judge Wilner, addressing the leg-
islative policy, stated: 
"[T]he legislture in enacting such a 
statute intended it to serve as a warn-
ing to first offenders and to afford 
them an opportunity to reform, and 
that the reason for the infliction of 
severer punishment for a repetition 
of offenses is not so much that de-
fendant has sinned more than once 
as that he is deemed incorrigible 
when he persists in violations of the 
law after conviction of previous in-
fractions. 06' 
By contrast to "conviction" under the 
habitual criminal statute, Maryland per-
mits probation before judgment upon a 
first "violation" of driving while intoxi-
cated or driving under the influence of 
alcohol, but it prohibits such a favorable 
dispoSition "for a second or subsequent 
violation ... ".66 In State v. McGrath,67 
the court addressed the "question [of] 
whether ... 'violation' refers to the actual 
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transgression ... or the subsequent adju-
dication of or conviction for the trans-
gression .... "68 The court held that "vio-
lation" is different from "conviction" and 
thus a person becomes, under the stat-
ute, a subsequent offender for a second 
violation, even though he has not yet had 
a first criminal proceeding or conviction. 
Juxtaposing the two terms, the court 
recognized that when the legislature uses 
the term "violation," the defendant may 
go beyond the "first" even though there 
has been no criminal proceeding. On the 
contrary, when the legislature uses the 
term "conviction," the defendant cannot 
go beyond the "first" until there has been 
a criminal prosecution resulting in adju-
dication of guilt and sentencing, and 
then, subsequent to conviction, there is 
conduct that produces another convic-
tion. 
Also instructive is the analogy to the 
concept of "reverse waiver" under the ju-
venile justice system.69 "Reverse waiver" 
permits transferring certain cases from 
criminal court to juvenile court "if a waiver 
is believed to be in the interests of the 
child or society. "70 The purpose is to treat 
as juveniles, and not as criminals, those 
persons who are amenable to juvenile re-
habilitation.71 The statute prohibits a 
"reverse waiver" to juvenile court of those 
juveniles who have already had "one bite 
of the apple." Subsection (b) provides: 
"The court may not transfer a case to the 
juvenile court under subsection (a) if: 
(1) The child has previously been waived 
to juvenile court and adjudicated delin-
quent; (2) The child was convicted in 
another unrelated case excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court .... "72 If the juvenile has been 
through the system before, Le., been ad-
judicated delinquent or convicted, the 
legislative determination is that the per-
son be treated as an adult. The key is 
whether the juvenile has learned from 
the mistake and become rel\abilitated or 
become a recidivist. The number of counts 
in the previous proceeding is immaterial 
to the legislative concern. 
AddresSing the right of ex-offenders to 
vote, the legislature did not consider the 
number of counts relevant. Instead, it fo-
cused on the number of criminal pro-
ceedings. It was the intent of the legisla-
ture to restore the right to vote only to 
those who were rehabilitated. A person 
does not demonstrate a lack of rehabilita-
tion by com.mitting a second violation 
following a first violation. Rather, a per-
son demonstrates a lack of rehabilitation 
by committing a second violation follow-
ing a first conviction. 
Louisiana offers the only previous ju-
dicial analysis of the statutory phrase "for 
the first conviction only." In State v. 
Wimberly,73 the defendant was found 
guilty, in one criminal proceeding, of five 
counts of drug distribution and two 
counts of drug posseSSion, and the judge 
imposed a suspended sentence. louisi-
ana law provides that the judge may im-
pose a suspended sentence "for the first 
conviction oniy."74The State argued that, 
because of the mUltiple counts, Wim-
berly was not being sentenced for his first 
conviction only, and thus a suspended 
sentence was in violation of the statute. 
In an analysis that goes to the heart of the 
issue in Broadwater, the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana stated: 
"[A] defendant is a 
first offender until 
he has proved 
incorrigible after a 
previous 
conviction. " 
Article 893 shares characteristics 
and objectives with the multiple of-
fender statute, and various repeated 
offense statutes. The common legis-
lative aim of such statutes is to serve 
as a warning to first offenders, to 
afford them an opportunity to re-
form .... Each statute is designed to 
accomplish these objects, at least in 
part, by limiting the judge's sentenc-
ing discretion after a first conviction 
and by erecting a threat of enhanced 
punishment for subsequent convic-
tions .... 
The general rule is that a defen-
dant is a first offender until he has 
proved incorrigible after a previ-
ous conviction. . . . [WJhether the 
defendant bas demonstrated such 
incorrigibility seems more relevant 
than whether a defendant faces 
more than a single charge in his 
first prosecution. tbe latter eventu-
ality may depend entirely on for-
tuitous circumstances or the prose-
cutor's discretion. 7' 
Measuring "for the first conviction only" 
from the other direction is People v. phi/-
lips,76 which interpreted the language 
"convicted of a second or subsequent 
offense." The court stated: "[A]n en-
hanced penalty should not be imposed 
until the offender has had the opportu-
nity to reform due to the salutary disci-
pline of the punishment which he has 
received as a consequence of his first 
conviction. "77 
Singular and Plural Include Each 
Other 
Although most rules of statutory con-
struction evolved from the judiciary, a 
few came from the legislature. One such 
principle of interpretation was provided 
by the Maryland General Assembly in 
article 1, section 8, as follows: "The sin-
gular always includes the plural, and visa 
versa, except when such construction 
would be unreasonable."78 
The statutory language at issue in 
Broadwater was "in connection with his 
first such conviction only. "79 Through the 
use of article 1, section 8, the legislature 
provided that article 33, section 3-4(c), 
has the same meaning it would have if it 
had been enacted as follows: "in connec-
tiori with his first such conviction or 
convictions only." This further demon-
strates that "first" and "only" taken to-
gether mean one time - one criminal 
proceeding. At that proceeding, so long 
as it is the "first" such proceeding, it does 
not matter whether the defendant faces 
one count or more. Singular and plural 
are interchangeable as to the word "con-
viction" because the legislature's con-
cern was whether the defendant was 
coming before the bar of justice for the 
first time, and thus subject to rehabilita-
tion under the statute, or whether the de-
fendant was returning to the bar of jus-
tice unrehabilitated. In Su v. Weaver, 80 
the court of appeals faced a similar issue 
when interpreting the following provi-
sion of the Maryland Health Claims Arbi-
tration Act: 
Determinations-The arbitration 
panel shall first determine the issue 
of liability with respect to a claim 
referred to it .... If the arbitration 
panel determines that a health care 
provider is liable to the Claimant or 
claimants, it shall then consider, 
I~TheLawForumV2~1---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
assess, and apportion appropriate 
damages against one or more of the 
health care providers that it has 
found to be liable.8! 
In Su, the trial judge permitted the 
claimant to introduce into evidence the 
arbitration panel's determination as fol-
lows: "1. IlABIU1Y: Defendant is liable." 
However, the judge denied the physi-
cian's attempt to introduce into evidence 
the accompanying opinion, which con-
tained specific findings as to each count. 
The claimant contended that "issue" is 
singular; the physician contended that 
"issue" can be singular or plural, depend-
ing upon the number of counts and theo-
ries advanced by the claimant. The court 
of appeals agreed with the physician, re-
lying on article I, section 8. 
The General Assembly's concern in en-
acting the legislation at issue in Su was 
not the number of counts presented by 
the claimant. Rather, the concern was to 
have all claims presented at one stage, 
followed by one apportionment of dam-
ages. This can only happen if the allega-
tion, be it one count or many, is pre-
sented first, prior to an assessment of 
damages. The frame of reference was the 
first versus mult.ple adjudications be-
cause the policy underlying the compul-
sory arbitration system for malpractice 
cases would be defeated if the claimants 
were permitted multiple "bites of the 
apple." 
Similarly, the legislature's concern, 
when enacting the voting rights restora-
tion statute, was "first" versus "subse-
quent" adjudications. A "rehabilatation" 
that would afford the ex-offender the 
right to vote was offered only after the 
first adjudiation. On the other hand, the 
rehabilitative policy would be defeated if 
the convict, having previously been con-
victed and sentenced, came before the 
court as a recidivist yet was still entitled to 
the benefits of rehabilitation. 
Consistent with this analysis is the 
opinion of former Attorney General 
Burch, interpreting the then applicable 
version of the statute that entitled a sher-
, iff to a $ 5 .00 fee "for service of a paper not 
including an execution of attachment. "82 
Applying article 1, section 8, the Attorney 
General ruled that "paper" includes paper 
or papers.83 The legislature's concern 
was for payment to the sheriff "for serv-
ice". like the word "conviction" in sec-
tion 3-4 (c), the word "service" is a term of 
art lending itself to an argument that 
each separate document is a separate 
service under the statute. Nonetheless, 
the Attorney General ruled that" [t ] he in-
tent [is] compensation to the sheriff for 
his efforts in effecting service, which are 
the same whether the service involves 
one paper or several papers."8~ It would 
have allowed form to prevail over sub-
stance to permit the sheriff to abuse the 
fee service schedule by counting each 
paper within a stack as a new service 
within the meaning of the statute. Simi-
larly, it would have been form over sub-
stance, in light of the legislative goal, to 
permit the State to abuse the right to vote 
by treating each guilty count in one trial 
as if it were a separate trial. 
Broadwater's position was that the leg-
islature, in its use of the word "convic-
tion", meant a criminal proceeding and 
not an individual criminal count. How-
ever, even if conviction does mean count, 
as a result of article 1, section 8, it means 
count or counts. As the court stated in 
Fogle v. State,85 "the term 'after former 
felony conviction' does not necessarily 
mean only one conviction. 'Conviction' 
may mean in a general sense one or more 
convictions."86 
"the legislature, in 
its use of the word 
'conviction', meant 
a criminal 
proceeding . .. " 
Remedial Legislation 
Judge Rodowsky stated that"[ t ]he con-
struction which we adopt is also consis-
tent with the rule favoring liberal con-
struction of remedial statutes. "87 The 1974 
amendment presented the court with 
classic remedial legislation. It was de-
signed to do what no prior Maryland law 
had done - restore the right to vote to 
rehabilitated first-timers. In accord with 
the modem, enlightened trend, the legis-
lature intended to remedy the historical 
wrong of imposing the same lifetime dis-
enfranchisement upon both rehabilitated 
and unrehabilitated ex-offenders. Stat-
utes that are "remedial in nature, de-
signed to correct existing law ... are to be 
liberally construed in order to advance 
the remedy .... "88 
This particular remedial legislation was 
also designed to eliminate a civil disabil-
ity. Any ambiguity as to enfranchisement 
versus disenfranchisment should be in-
terpreted in favor of restoration of the 
right to vote and against the civil disabil-
ity of permanent disenfranchisement. The 
court of appeals "has consistently and 
repeatedly embraced [the] position" that 
civil disability statutes should be inter-
preted in favor of "valuable rights and 
privileges to be lost .... "89 One of the rea-
sons for such an interpretation is the goal 
of rehabilitating ex-offenders. 
Other states construe ambiguities simi-
larly. The Vermont disenfranchisement 
statute provides: "[T]his chapter shall be 
liberally construed, so that if there is any 
reasonable doubt whether a [person 
should be disenfranchised] the person 
shall have the right to have the person's 
name immediately returned to the check-
list. "90 The West Virginia Attorney Gen-
eral stated: 
[W]e should not deprive [the] right 
to vote, except by clear words of dis-
franchisement. , .. He ought to have 
a voice and representation under 
principles offree government. True, 
he has once offended, but he has 
paid the penalty fIXed by the law of 
his state. Reflect that the Constitution 
is broad in its grant of suffrage .... 
To exclude him the language must 
be clear, ... It is wrong to debar of 
a great privilege except where there 
is no escape from it.91 
Laws governing the qualification and 
registration of voters should be "con-
strued liberally and favorably toward the 
right to vote,"n The Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma similarly stated: "[W]e think 
(as the majority of courts appear to) that 
when ... the imposition of a penalty as 
serious as disenfranchisement is involved, 
the strict legal definition of such terms 
should be applied, "93 likewise, the Su-
preme Court of Georgia stated: "'Forfei-
tures are not favored, and courts incline 
against them. When a statute may be con-
strued so as to give a penalty, and also so 
as to withhold the penalty, it will be given 
the latter construction. "'9~ 
Moreover, civil disabilities, such as 
disenfranchisement, have also been con-
sidered criminal or quasi-criminal 
punishment.95 "The history of disability 
statutes demonstates that these laws were 
inspired in England as punitive measures 
and were perpetuated by American legis-
latures without consideration oftheir ra-
tionale or effect."96 Statutes that are penal 
in nature are strictly construed.97 Any am-
biguity as to the punishment intended 
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should be resolved, under the rule of 
lenity, in favor of the person to be pun-
ished.lI8 
Effect of House Bill 617 
The State argued that the defeat, in 
1978, of House Bill 617 supports its 
position. The State argued that House 
Bill 617 attempted unsuccessfully to ac-
complish what Broadwater claimed to be 
the meaning of article 33, section 3-4 (c). 
The State's position was that if the law 
already meant what Broadwater claimed, 
then there would have been nc need to 
introduce House Bill 617. Broadwater 
countered this argument on two grounds. 
First, the court of appeals has recog-
nized that the enactment of an amend-
ment does not explain what the law meant 
prior to the amendment.99 A fortiori, non-
enactment does not explain what the law 
means. "[T]he fact that a bill on a specific 
subject fails of passage in the General 
Assembly is a rather weak reed upon 
which to lean in ascertaining legislative 
intent. "100 Moreover, the relevance of 
legislative activity, whether resulting in 
enactment or non-enactment, toward the 
understanding of the intent of the legis-
lature prior to such activity, is even more 
dubious when there has been no judicial 
gloss to make the legislature aware of any 
statutory defect or ambiguity.lol Neither 
the court of appeals nor the court of 
special appeals had ever interpreted ar-
ticle 33, section 3-4 (c), prior to the Broad-
water case. In addition, the court of 
appeals has recognized that legislative at-
tempts, both successful and unsuccess-
ful, may merely seek to eliminate ambi-
guities in existing law.l02 
Second, the defeat of House Bill 617 in 
no way affected the Broadwater case. By 
taking out of context the words "if simul-
taneously sentenced" from House Bill 
617, the State argued that the bill would 
have accomplished what Broadwater was 
arguing. The State misunderstood the 
two fundamental changes in the law that 
House Bill 617 would have made, neither 
of which addressed the meaning of the 
statute before the court in Broadwater. 
The disqualifying crimes in section 3-
4(c) are "theft or other infamous crime."I03 
"'Infamous crime' means any felony, trea-
son, perjury, or any crime involving an 
element of deceit, fraud or corruption."I04 
House Bill 617 would have changed the 
focus of the disqualification from the 
type of crime involved to the size of 
penalty imposed. An "infamous crime" 
would have become "any crime (or com-
bination of crimes, if simultaneously sen-
tenced) for which the total sentence 
imposed, after deducting any suspension 
or relief from sentence granted by the 
court, is confinement in a correctional fa-
cility for more than one year or a fine of 
52,500 or more, or both."IO' 
Under section 3-4(c), disenfranchise-
ment for first-timers lasts until comple-
tion of the sanction and for recidivists it 
lasts forever. House Bill 617 would have 
continued the lifetime disenfranchise-
ment for recidivists and would have 
changed the period of disqualification 
for first-timers to the completion of the 
sanction or one year, whichever is greater. 
"The disqualifying 
crimes, , , are 'theft 
or other infamous 
crimes', " 
Thus, not only does nonenactment 
provide no explanation of legislative in-
tent, even if it did the nonenactment 
would have had to have been of a bill sub-
stantially similar to the position argued 
by Broadwater. House Bill 617 was too 
dissimilar to have its defeat serve as any 
message from the legislature as to its 
intent in 1974 when it changed, through 
Senate Bill 57, the law of lifetime disen-
franchisement. The court of appeals, hav-
ing already resolved the statutory con-
struction issue, elected not to address the 
State's argument surrounding the non-
enactment of House Bill 617. 
Equal Protection 
Broadwater made one nonconstitu-
tional and two constitutional arguments 
related to equal protection, all of which 
the court of appeals expressly declined to 
address. The first argument was that stat-
utes affecting the fundamental right to 
vote should be construed broadly from 
the standpoint of the right to vote and 
strictly from the standpoint of limiting 
the right to vote.106 
Broadwater argued that, even without 
the court addressing the merits of his 
equal protection arguments, the mere 
existence of a nonfrivilous equal protec-
tion issue was sufficient for the court to 
resolve the statutory construction issue 
in his favor. In Davis v. State, 107 Judge 
McAuliffe explained that the stronger the 
merits of a constitutional challenge, the 
more the need to interpret the statute in 
favor of the challenger, thus avoiding the 
constitutional dilemma. He stated: 
As a matter of statutory construc-
tion, this Court has consistently 
adhered to the principle that we 
will, whenever reasonably poSSible, 
construe and apply a statute to avoid 
casting serious doubt upon its con-
stitutionality. The interpretation 
urged by the State generates serious 
equal protection questions. There 
may be no rational basis for the dis-
crimination that would result from 
the State's construction of [the stat-
ute].108 
Broadwater argued that if the court 
were to rule in favor of the State, such a 
holding would cast grave doubts upon 
the constitutionality of article 33, section 
3-4 (c) , particularly in light ofthe "strict 
scrutiny-compelling state interest-funda-
mental right to vote analysis."IOll When 
there are two reasonable interpretations, 
the court should adopt the interpreta-
tion that permits it to avoid even reaching 
the constitutional issue.llo 
Broadwater's second equal protection 
argument was that, because the right to 
vote is a fundamental constitutional right, 
if article 33, section 3-4(c), were to re-
store the right to vote to rehabilitated 
first-timers who were convicted of one 
count in one trial, but to impose lifetime 
disenfranchisement on rehabilitated first-
timers who were convicted of multiple 
counts in one trial, such unequal distri-
bution of the right to vote would fail to 
satisfy the requisite strict scrutiny test. 
This test requires a compelling state in-
terest for such discrimination and also re-
quires the least restrictive impact on the 
right to vote. 
"No right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the 
election of those who make the laws 
under which, as good Citizens, we must 
live. Other rights, even the most basic are 
illusory if the right to vote is under-
minded."111 It is "a fundamental political 
right, because [it is] preservative of all 
rights."1J2 "[S]tatutes distributing the fran-
chise constitute the foundation of our 
representative SOCiety. Any unjustified 
discrimination in determining who may 
participate ... in the selection of public 
officials undermines the legitimacy of 
representative government."1J3 "The right 
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to vote freely for the candidate of one's 
choice is of the essence of a democratic 
society, and any restrictions on that right 
strike at the heart of representative gov-
ernment."114 "To the extent that a citi-
zen's right to vote is debased, he is that 
much less a citizen."115 
Because the right to vote is a funda-
mental constitutional privilege, any cur-
tailment or denial of that privilege must 
satisfy the Supreme Court's test of strict 
judicial scrutiny, requiring the State to 
demonstrate a compelling governmental 
interest for such a denial. 1I6 The Court 
has stated that, under the compelling 
state interest test, "a heavy burden of jus-
tification is on the State."117 Even the 
showing of "a very substantial state inter-
est" is insufficient.1I8 Moreover, "the def-
erence ususally given to the judgment of 
legislators does not extend to decisions 
concerning which resident citizens may 
participate in the election of legislators 
and other public officials .... Accord-
ingly, when we are reviewing statutes 
which deny some residents the right to 
vote, the general presumption of consti-
tutionality afforded state statutes [is] not 
applicable. "119 
Not only must denial be compellingly 
justified, but the justification must be 
served through the least restrictive of all 
possible alternatives. In Dunn v. Blum-
stein, the Supreme Court stated: 
Statutes affecting constitutional 
rights must be drawn with "preci-
sion," and must be "tailored" to serve 
their legitimate objectives. And if 
there are other, reasonable ways to 
achieve those goals with a lesser 
burden on constitutionally pro-
tected activity, a State may not choose 
the way of greater interference. If it 
acts at all, it must choose "less dras-
tic means."120 
Maryland has likewise recognized that 
the "right of citizens to vote is a funda-
mental right in our society and one which 
is zealously guarded by the courts. "121 In 
Broadwater v. State,122 while holding 
that the right to seek elective office is not 
a fundamental right, the court of appeals 
recognized that the strict scrutiny test 
applies to the right to vote. 
With the foregoing framework for 
analysis, the question becomes how, if at 
all, does Richardson v. Ramlrezl23 affect 
the application of this constitutional 
doctrine in the Broadwater case. 
Richardson addressed the relationship 
between section one of the fourteenth 
amendment, the equal protection clause, 
"in dealing with voting rights as it does,"124 
and section two, prohibiting the denial of 
the right to vote to 21-year-old males, "ex-
cept for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime. "125 The Court interpreted 
section two to permit a state to totally 
disenfranchise, as a group, all convicted 
felons. The controlling issue in both the 
California Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court was the authority 
of a state to disenfranchise this group of 
potential voters, as a groUp.126 "Although 
the plaintiffs in Richardson could have 
challenged the disparity between the 
means of reenfranchisement available to 
convicted felons ... , they did not do 
SO."127 
Broadwater argued that Richardson 
did not address disenfranchisement of 
some, but not all, within the "section 
two" group. If some, but not all, are 
disenfranchised, the equal protection 
clause of section one controls. The Court 
in Richardson recognized this when, not-
withstanding its sanction of total disen-
franchisement, it remanded the case to 
address whether there was disparate treat-
ment of convicted felons in different 
counties and, if so, whether such dis par-
ityviolated the equal'protection clause.128 
Broadwater argued that the Maryland 
legislature could have elected to disen-
franchise all convicted felons. However, 
when in 1974 it enacted legislation to 
provide the right to vote to rehabilitated 
first-timers, it was constitutionally re-
quired to provide that right equally to all 
such people. "[I]f a challenged statute 
grants the right to vote to some citizens 
and denies the franchise to others, 'the 
Court must determine whether the ex-
clusions are necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest."'129 As Justice Pow-
ell stated: "The right of all persons to 
vote, once the State has decided to make 
it available to some, becomes a basic 
one under the Constitution. "130 The leg-
islature must distribute and restore the 
right to vote equally because of the 
"requir[ ement of] uniform treatment of 
persons standing in the same relation 
"131 
The State countered by arguing that 
Broadwater did "not cite a single case 
which holds that a state's disenfranchise-
ment of some or all convicted felons is 
subject to strict scrutiny."B2 The State 
continued: 
Richardson and its predecessors 
clearly control this case. Indeed, as 
the circuit court below correctly rec-
ognized, in Thiess v. State Adminis-
trative Board of Election Laws, 387 
F. Supp. 1038 (D. Md. 1974), a 
three-judge panel rejected an equal 
protection assault on the very stat-
ute assailed here: "State statutes 
disenfranchising those ofits citizens 
who are convicted of 'infamous 
crimes' unless pardoned do not 
contravene the Equal Protection 
Clause. Thiess, 387 F. Supp. at 1041. 
In [f]act, the Thiess court tells us 
that Richardson v. Ramirez repre-
sents the final word upon the Equal 
Protection Claim."m 
Broadwater's third equal protection 
argument was that, even if the right to 
vote were not a fundamental constitu-
tional right, if article 33, section 3-4(c), 
were to restore the right to vote to reha-
bilitated first-timers who were convicted 
of one count in one trial, but to impose 
lifetime disenfranchisement on rehabili-
tated first-timers who were convicted of 
multiple counts in one trial, such un-
equal distribution of the right to vote 
would fail to satisfy even the rational 
basis test. He argued that, notwithstand-
ing the historical ease of satisfying the ra-
tional basis test, the Supreme Court, 
consistent with the expanding notion of 
equal protection, has recently held stat-
utes to be violative of the equal protec-
tion clause because they were not sup-
ported by a rational basis.IH 
Conclusion 
It appeared all along that the Broad-
water case would almost certainly be re-
solved on statutory construction grounds. 
The statutory construction issue pre-
sented numerous relevant and overlap-
ping principles of interpretation. Al-
though there was authOrity to support 
both Sides, the analysis supporting Broad-
water's position was stronger and the 
court of appeals was correct to adopt it. 
The equal protection issue presented 
a conflict between the fundamental right 
to vote and the power of the State to 
disenfranchise convicted felons. The au-
thority on the State's side was quite strong. 
Because Broadwater prevailed under the 
court's resolution of the statutory con-
struction issue, the court was correct to 
avoid the constitutional question. 
The six-year saga of former Senator 
Broadwater in the federal and state courts 
has come to an end. As a result of the 
reinstatement of Broadwater's right to 
vote by the court of appeals, he becomes 
eligible to seek public office, and Broad-
water has announced that he plans to do 
so. Consequently, Broadwater now leaves 
the judicial arena and reenters the politi-
cal arena. 
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wealth, 276 Ky. 802, 125 S.W.2d 728 
(1939» (emphasis added by the court of 
appeals). 
'9Id. (quoting Combs v. Commonwealth, 
652 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky. 1983» (em-
phasis added by the court of appeals). 
60109 N.J. Super. 69, 262 A.2d 238 (1970). 
61262 A.2d at 241-42 (quoting in part 
Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431, 
433 (1st Cir. 1955». 
62Md.Ann. Code art. 27, §643B(b) (1987). 
63Montone, 308 Md. at 613, 521 A.2d at 
728. 
6459 Md. App. 97, 474 A.2d 931, cert. 
denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 
(1984). 
65Id. at 113, 474 A.2d at 938 (quoting 
Annotation, Habitual Criminal Statutes, 
24A.L.R.2d 1247,1248 (1952» (empha-
sis added by Judge Wilner). 
"Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 641(a)(2) 
(Supp. 1989). 
6777 Md. App. 310, 550 A.2d 402 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
68Id. at 313, 550 A.2d at 403-04. 
69See Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 594A 
(1987). 
7°Id. § 594A(a); see In re Ricky B., 43 Md. 
App. 645, 406 A.2d 690 (1979). 
71See In re Bobby C., 48 Md. App. 249, 426 
A.2d 435, affd, 292 Md. 114,437 A.2d 
660 (1981). 
72Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 594A(b) 
(emphasis added).· 
7314 So. 2d 666 (La. 1982). 
74La. Code Crim. Pcoc. Ann. art. 893 
(Supp. 1989). 
75414 So. 2d at 672-74 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added); see Md. Ann. Code 
art. 27, § 340(1)(5) (1987) (permitting 
the prosecution to charge multiple thefts, 
committed pursuant to one scheme, as 
one count or as multiple counts). 
7656 Ill. App. 3d 689, 371 N.E.2d 1214 
(1978). 
77371 N.E.2d at 1219 (citations omitted). 
78Md. Ann. Code art. 1, § 8 (1987). 
79Md. Ann. Code art. 33, § 3-4(c). 
80313 Md. 370, 545 A.2d 692 (1988). 
81Md. Cts. &Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A-
05 (Supp. 1988). 
82Id. § 7-402(a)(i). 
8361 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 779 (1976). 
84Id. at 780. 
85700 P.2d 208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). 
86Id. at 212. 
87Broadwater, 317 Md. at 353, 563 A.2d 
at 426. 
88State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195,208, 328 
A.2d 737, 745 (1974); accord Tucker v. 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 
69,77 (1986); 70 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 87, 
90 (1985) ("well-established rule of statu-
tory construction requiring" liberal con-
struction) (emphasis added). In Sinai 
Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Employment & Training, 309 
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Md. 28, 40, 522 A.2d 382,388 (1987), the 
ccourt of appeals held that, in light of the 
remedial nature of unemployment com-
pensation laws, they "should be read lib-
erally in favor of eligibility, and ... dis-
qualification provisions are to be strictly 
construed. " 
89Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 643, 496 
A.2d 312, 314 (1985) (quoting in part 
Collateral Consequences, supra at 953-
54). 
lIOVt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2150(d)(4) (Supp. 
1988); see also People ex rei. Grogan v. 
Lisinski, 113 Ill. App. 3d 276, 446 N .E.2d 
1251, 1253-54 (1983). 
9151 W. Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 182, 183 (1965) 
(quoting Osborne v. Kanawha County 
Court, 68 W. Va. 189, 69 S.E. 470, 471 
(1910». 
92Funkhouser v. Landfried, 124 W. Va. 
654, 22 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1942). 
93State ex rei. Heartsill v. County Elec-
tion Board of Carter County, 326 P.2d 
782, 786 (Okla. 1958). 
94Summerour v. Cartrett, 220 Ga. 31, 
136 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1964). 
95See generally Collateral Consequences, 
supra at 1184-1218, 1222-24. 
96Id. at 1192; see United States v. Brown, 
381 u.s. 437 (1965); Trop v. Dulles, 356 
u.s. 86 (1958); see also In re C;oppola, 
155 Ohio St. 329, 98 N.E.2d 807, 810 
(1951) ("quasi-penar) (emphasis in 
original). 
97See Briggs v. State, 289 Md. 23, 31-32, 
421 A.2d 1369, 1374 (1980); Wheeler v. 
State, 281 Md. 593, 597-98, 380 A.2d 
1052, 1055, cert. denied, 435 u.s. 997 
(1977). 
98E.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 u.s. 
6, 13-16 (1978);Statev.Jenkins, 307 Md. 
501, 521, 515 A.2d 465, 475 (1986) 
("merger by legislative intent''); Walker 
v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 201, 452 A.2d 
1234, 1250 (1982), cert. denied, 296 Md. 
63 (1983). 
"American Recovery Co., Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Health & Mental Hygiene, 306 
Md. 12, 18, 506A.2d 1171,1174 (1986). 
lOOAutomobile Trade Ass'n of Maryland, 
Inc. v. Insurance Comm'r, 292 Md. 15, 
24,437 A.2d 199, 203 (1986). 
10lSee Creighton v. State, 70 Md. App. 
124, 138, 520 A.2d 382, 389 (1987). 
102Harden v. Mass Transit Administra-
tion, 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817, 
820-21 (1976). 
103Md. Ann. Code art. 33, § 1-1 (Supp. 
1988). 
104Id. § 1-1 (a) (9). 
I05H. 617, 1978 Md. Leg. Sess. 
I06See, e.g., ArapflJolu v. McMenamin, 
113 Cal. App. 2d824, 249P.2d 318, 322-
23 (1952) (because the "rightto vote had 
been described 'as one of the highest 
privileges ofthe citizen', and as 'one of 
the most important functions of good 
citizenship.' ... No citizen should be dis-
franchised lightly or on ultra-technical 
grounds"); In reMerrill, 96 Cal. App. 58, 
273 P. 863, 866 (1928) ("the right to vote 
. . . is a constitutional right, and is not to 
be denied, unless there is a plain provi-
sion ofthe Code, relative to the method 
of exercising that right, which prohib-
its"). 
107312 Md. 172,539 A.2d 218 (1988). 
I08Jd. at 179-80, 539A.2d at 221-22 (cita-
tions omitted). 
l09Srief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 31-
47. 
110G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh 
Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 763-64, 521 
A.2d 1225, 1234 (1987). In Slate v. Zit-
omer, 275 Md. 534, 544, 341 A.2d 789, 
795 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Gas-
perich v. Church, 423 u.s. 1076 (1976), 
Judge Eldridge applied this principle of 
adopting an interpretation that avoids 
addressing the merits of the constitu-
tional issue, stating that the "constitu-
tional argument is not frivolous." 
11IWestberry v. Sanders, 376 u.s. 1, 17 
(1964). 
1I2YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 
(1886). 
113Kramer v. Union Free School District 
No. 15, 395 u.s. 6~1, 626 (1969). 
114Reynolds v. Sims, 377 u.s. 533, 555, 
rehearing denied, 379 u.s. 870-71 
(1964). 
115Id. at 567; see Richardson v. Ramirez, 
418 U.S. 24,83 (1974) (Marshall,]., dis-
senting) ("The ballot is the democratic 
system's coin of the realm.")j Reynolds, 
377 u.s. at 561-62 ("Undoubtly, the right 
of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a 
free and democratic society.")j Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 139 (1970) 
(quoting in part United States v. Classic, 
313 u.s. 299,315 (1941» ("This 'right to 
choose, secured by the Constitution,' is a 
civil right of the highest order."); accord 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 u.s. 641, 
654 (1966) ("precious and fundemen-
tal"). 
116Kramer, 395 u.s. at 627-28 ("whether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote 
a compelling state interest .... The need 
for exacting judicial scrutiny"); Evans v. 
Corman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) ("pur-
pose of the restriction and the assertedly 
overriding interests served by it must 
meet close constitutional scrutiny"); Rey-
nolds, 377 u.s. at 562 ("infringement of 
the right of citizens to vote must be care-
fully and meticulously scrutinized"); 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 383 u.s. at 670 ("classifica-
tions which might invade or restrain [the 
right to vote] must be closely scrutinized 
and carefully confined"); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 u.s. 330, 360 (1972) ("exact-
ing standard of preCision"); Rosario v. 
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 768, rehear-
ingdenied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (powell, 
]., dissenting) ("withstand the strict judi-
cial scrutiny called for"). 
117Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 . 
118Id. 
119Kramer, 395 u.s. at 627-28 (emphasis 
added). 
12°Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 (citations omit-
ted). 
12156 Md. Op.Att'yGen. 189, 190 (1971); 
see also State v. Key, 128 Ariz. 419, 626 
P.2d 149, 151 (1981) (restoration of the 
right to vote construed favorably to the 
defendant, but not the right to expunge-
ment, because there is a fundamental 
right to vote but not to have one's crimi-
nal record expunged). 
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122306 Md. 597, 510A.2d 583 (1986). 
m418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
124Id. at 55. 
I25U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. 
126See Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 394 
(4th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Shepherd v. 
Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
12575 F.2d at 1112-13. 
12
8Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56; see, e.g., 
Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 26-27 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 963 (1983); 
Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 515 
(5th Cir. 1982); Shepherd, 575 F.2d at 
1114; Allen, 664 F .2d at 400 (Murnaghan, 
J., concurring) ("implied equal 
protection"); see also Hunter v. Under-
wood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). "The State's 
interest in perserving the 'purity' of the 
franchise may allow it to exclude all felons, 
cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, but exclusion 
of some, but not all, of the subject cate-
gory of persons (here, misdemeanants) 
must be supported by a compelling state 
interest." Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 
362, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (emphasis 
added); Tate v. Collins, 496 F. Supp. 205, 
207 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); see also Collier 
v. Menzel, 176 Cal. App. 3d 24,221 Cal. 
Rptr. 110, 113-14 (1985). 
129Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337 (quoting Kra-
mer, 395 U.S. at 627) (emphasis in Dunn). 
130 Rosario, 410 U.S. at 764 (dissenting 
opinion) (emphasis added); accord 
Harper, 383 U.S. at 665, 670 (once 
granted, the franchise must be distrib-
uted equally); 56 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 189, 
191 (1971). 
BlReynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; accord 
Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 516 
("between Similarly situated individuals"); 
Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391,405 (Hall, 
]., dissenting) ("among persons of equal 
culpability") . 
I32Reply Brief of Appellants-Cross-Appel-
lees at 16. 
mId. at 19. 
IHSee generally City of Cleburne v. cle-
burneLivingCenter, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); 
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 
472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. W.G. Ward,]r., 470 
U.S. 869, rehearing denied, 471 U.S. 
1120 (1985); see, e.g., O'Brien v. Skin-
ner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974) (invalidated 
statute that permitted incarcerated pre-
trial detainees and misdemeanants to vote 
by absentee ballot, if incarcerated in a 
county other than their residence, but 
denied the same to persons Similarly in-
carcerated within the county of their 
residence); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 
134 (1972) (statute violated equal pro-
tection by requiring a candidate filing fee 
and providing no alternative for 
indigents); Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 
362 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (no rational basis in 
the selection of disqualifying crimes); 
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. 
Iowa 1974) (no rational relationship be-
tween excluding convicted felons from 
civil service employment and the legiti-
mate purpose of protection of the public 
trust); see also Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 
593, 380 A.2d 1052, cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 997 (1977). 
Broadwater also argued that the prose-
cutor determines which counts to charge 
and which counts to press to the jury. As 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated, 
when interpreting the language "for the 
first conviction only," "whether a defen-
dant faces more than a single count in his 
first prosecution ... may depend entirely 
on fortuitous circumstances or the prose-
cutor's discretion." State v. Wimberly, 
414 So.2d 666, 674 (1982). Cj Trap v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,118-19 (1956) (expa-
triation resulted as much from prosecu-
torial discretion within military trials as 
any other factor). 
Broadwater further argued that the reen-
franchisement statute, if so interpreted, 
is fatally flawed because of its overinclu-
siveness and its failure to tailor to the 
least restrictive alternative. In Butts v. 
Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 
1974), the court invalidated a statute that 
prohibited civil service employment of 
convicted felons. Finding the statute 
overinclusive, the court stated: "[N]o 
consideration is given to the nature and 
seriousness ofthe crime." Id. at 581. The 
court in Butts also found that "the time 
elapsing since the conviction [and] the 
degree of the felon's rehabilitation ... are 
similarly ignored." Id. Finally, the overin-
clusiveness analysis of Butts addressed 
the law's failure to consider "the circum-
stances under which the crime was com-
mitted ... " Id.; see also Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134, 146 (1972) (statute "ex-
traordinarily ill-fitted to [its] goal; other 
means to protect those valid interests are 
available") . 
Broadwater also argued that the voting 
restoration statute, if so interpreted, is fa-
tally flawed because it contains an uncon-
stitutional irrebutable presumption. The 
State's interpretation classifies together, 
and disenfranchises for life, both recidi-
vists and rehabilitated first-timers con-
victed of multiple counts in one trial. The 
recidivists, prior to becoming recidiviSts, 
had the opportunity to restore their right 
to vote by becoming rehabilitated, i.e., by 
never again being convicted of a disquali-
fying crime, assuming only one count in 
the first trial. By contrast, rehabilitated 
first-timers, who were convicted of more 
than one count in one trial, are irrebuta-
bly presumed not capable of rehabilita-
tion. They will never be permitted even 
one chance at rehabilitation because they 
received their second conviction along 
with their first conviction. The statute 
declares that, as a matter oflaw, all first-
timers convicted of one count in one 
trial, who do not become recidivists, are 
rehabilitated, and thus their right to vote 
is automatically restored upon comple-
tion of their sanction. On the other hand, 
the statute declares that, as a matter of 
law, all first-timers convicted of multiple 
counts in one trial, even if they never 
become recidivists, are, and for the rest of 
their lives remain, unrehabilitated and 
incapable of becoming rehabilitated, and 
thus their right to vote is automatically 
denied for life. In Carrington v. Rash, 
380 U.s. 89 (1965), the Supreme Court 
stated: "'[T]he presumption here cre-
ated is .. . definitely conclusive L inca-
pable of being overcome by proof of the 
most positive character.' ... Not one of 
them can evervote .... " Id. at 96 (citation 
omitted). In Rosario, the Court analyzed 
the common thread among six of its prior 
rulings, each holding unconstitutional a 
voting statute. "In each of those cases, the 
State totally denied the electoral fran-
chise to a particular class of residents, 
and there was no way in which the 
members of that class could have made 
themselves eligible to vote." 410 U.S. at 
757; see also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 
814,818 (1969) (striking down a "rigid, 
arbitrary formula"). 
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